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Abstract: 
This paper uses Colombian micro-data to analyze the role of education and informality on 
regional wage differentials. Our hypothesis is that apart from differences in the endowment of 
human capital, regional heterogeneity in the incidence of informality is another important source 
of regional wage inequality in emerging countries. This is confirmed by the evidence from 
Colombia, which also reveals remarkable spatial heterogeneity in the wage return to individuals’ 
characteristics. Regional heterogeneity in returns to education is especially intense in the upper 
part of the wage distribution. In turn, heterogeneity in the informal pay penalty is more relevant 
at the bottom.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, several studies have registered the decline in income 
inequality for Latin American countries (López-Calva & Lustig, 2010; Gasparini 
et al., 2011). While this trend in income inequality has received special attention 
at the national level, studies on regional disparities in the components of 
individuals’ income are still scarce for this part of the world. Analyses focusing 
on the regional dimension are of great relevance, because even in the presence of 
declining income inequality at national level, important interregional disparities 
may persist. This is so because socio-economic indicators at the national level can 
often hide significant variances between territories of the same country. This 
study considers the case of Colombia, a country that, despite a decrease in 
income inequality in the past decade, presents one of the highest Gini 
coefficients of Latin American countries and faces large geographical 
inequalities. 1  Colombia shows important disparities in economic and social 
development among its regions. This implies that an important part of inequality 
between Colombian individuals may be the consequence of disparities between 
regions of the country (Bonet & Meisel, 2008; Joumard & Londoño, 2013). In 
particular, differences in wages deserve attention from a regional perspective as, 
for example, in 2010 the average gross hourly wage in a small city, such as 
Cucuta, was only 66% of that paid in Bogota, the country’s capital. 
This study pays special attention to spatial imbalances in the endowment 
of human capital, and to the extent that these differences and the regional 
heterogeneity in the return to this type of capital may help to explain regional 
wage gaps. But, unlike most previous studies for developing countries, as a new 
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and major contribution this paper also focuses on one important feature of 
almost all developing and emerging countries: the large proportion of workers 
employed in informal jobs. In this regard, our hypothesis is that regional 
differences in the availability of good jobs that generate higher wages explain a 
large part of regional wage gaps in a developing country such as Colombia. This 
means that, apart from differences in the endowment of and return to human 
capital, regional heterogeneity in the incidence of informality is likely to be 
another important source of regional wage disparities. As far as we are aware, this 
issue has not been considered in any of the previous studies on regional wage 
disparities. We estimate the return to education and the pay penalty of informal 
work for each Colombian region, controlling for the effect of a large set of other 
observed characteristics by using mean and quantile regression models. 
Afterwards, we use these estimates to decompose the regional wage gaps into the 
contribution of differences in the regional distribution of characteristics, and into 
the contribution of differences in wage structures. In doing so, we apply the 
standard Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition at the mean and the decomposition for 
unconditional quantile regression (UQR) models proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) 
and Fortin et al. (2011). In contrast with other procedures (Machado & Mata, 
2005; Melly, 2005), the latter approach allows us to isolate the particular 
contribution of education and informality to the regional wage gap at different 
quantiles. Galego & Pereira (2014) applied this method in their study of regional 
wage differentials in Portugal. As far as we know, this is the first application for 
the analysis of regional wage differentials of a developing country. 
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A comprehensive micro-level dataset for Colombia is exploited to obtain 
the empirical evidence in this paper. Therefore, the approach differs from that in 
other recent studies that have analysed variation in wages across the space using 
aggregate data for a set of spatial units (e.g. Fingleton and Palombi, 2016). In 
contrast with the focus of these aggregate studies on the regional determinants of 
wages (including spatial spillovers), the analysis in this paper concentrates on the 
role paid by individual-level determinants, particularly schooling and informal 
job.Our results confirm previous evidence on the existence of significant regional 
wage differentials between the Golden Triangle region, demarcated by the cities 
of Cali, Medellin and Bogota, and other regions in the country. Interestingly, they 
show that Colombian regions not only differ in earning-relevant characteristics, 
but also display sizeable regional variability in the returns to these characteristics. 
In particular, the return to education is far from regionally uniform and workers 
face rather variable informal pay penalties throughout the territory. Altogether, 
the evidence in this study points to the conclusion that some public policies 
aimed at reducing human capital differences among regions will help to decrease 
regional wage gaps, especially at the higher part of the wage distribution. 
However, equalizing years of education of workers across regions would not be 
enough to reduce regional wage disparities due to the sizeable differences in 
returns to education at higher quantiles. Meanwhile, policies that point towards 
the reduction of informality will help to reduce regional wage gaps at the lower 
end of the wage distribution, particularly for those regions with sizeable 
informality.  
	 3 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
briefly summarizes the previous related literature, and section 3 presents a 
description of the data used. The methodology applied in this study is outlined in 
section 4 and in section 5 we report and discuss the results. Finally, conclusions 
are presented in section 6. 
2. Brief Literature Review 
To explain large spatial wage disparities, a number of arguments have been 
proposed. One of them emphasizes that wage disparities across areas are caused 
by differences in amenities. For instance, certain areas may have a favourable 
climate and easier access to natural resources. Under this context, wage 
differentials may be seen as compensated differentials, meaning that some areas 
may have higher wages to attract workers so as to compensate for the lack of 
amenities (Greenwood et al., 1991). Another explanation is related to the point 
that differences in wages across regions could reflect spatial differences in the 
skill composition of the workforce (Combes et al., 2008). Workers with better 
labour market characteristics tend to sort into regions that concentrate industries 
with high skill requirements, where wages tend to be higher. Related to this last 
explanation, the third one is based on agglomeration economies. A larger pool of 
highly skilled workers in an area may provide a source of important knowledge 
spillovers that can lead to productivity gains (Glaeser et al., 1992). Also, labour 
pooling improves the matching of firms and workers, which could also increase 
economic efficiency and lead to higher wages (Andersson et al., 2007).  
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A number of studies have been devoted to measuring the degree of 
regional wage gaps and identifying their origin. For instance, Blackaby & Murphy 
(1995), Duranton & Monastiriotis (2002), and Dickey (2007) analyse the case of 
Great Britain; García & Molina (2002), Motellón et al. (2011), and López-Bazo & 
Motellón (2012) that of Spain; and Galego & Pereira (2014) and Pereira & 
Galego (2014) that of Portugal. 2  These studies centre their analysis on the 
estimation of wage equations and on the decomposition of regional wage gaps. 
The decomposition analysis is based on the idea that regional wage differentials 
are the result of how characteristics that determine wages are distributed across 
regions (the endowment component) and by how differently these characteristics 
are rewarded (the wage structure component). The extent to which these two 
components explain regional wage differentials has been of great interest in past 
studies and their importance in explaining regional wage gaps differs considerably 
across and within countries. Some studies conclude that regional wage 
differentials are mostly due to differences between regions in individual 
characteristics (Blackaby & Murphy, 1995). Other studies found that a significant 
part of wage differentials is explained by differences in returns (Motellón et al., 
2011; Galego & Pereira, 2014; and Pereira & Galego, 2014), while some others 
point out that both components play an important role (García & Molina, 2002). 
Less evidence is available on the amount and origin of regional disparities using 
individual-level data in the Latin American countries. Azzoni & Servo (2002), 
using micro-data for the 10 largest metropolitan regions in Brazil, found that 
wage differentials were lower after adding controls for worker and job 
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characteristics and cost of living, though they remain sizeable. They found 
education as the most important variable for explaining regional wage disparities.  
A distinctive feature of almost all developing and emerging countries is 
the large proportion of workers employed in informal jobs. Half of the employed 
population in almost all Latin American labour markets works in informal jobs 
(e.g. Bacchetta et al., 2009). Informal workers generally earn lower wages 
compared to similar formal workers, according to the traditional segmentation 
hypothesis (Fields, 1975), are excluded from the social security system and are 
trapped in unproductive activities (ILO, 2011). Interestingly, recent studies for 
Colombia have emphasized that informal jobs are not equally distributed across 
the main metropolitan areas of the country (Galvis, 2012). As an example, some 
Colombian cities have informality rates of around 60%, while the incidence of 
informality in other territories is about 20%. Ortiz et al. (2008) suggested that the 
Colombian labour market is segmented in two dimensions. The first is an intra-
regional or scale segmentation, which is mainly due to the restrictions on the 
access to physical and human capital that limited the possibility of expansion of 
firms to a larger scale. This type of segmentation may imply that workers and 
employers in the informal sector, usually associated with small establishments, 
face significant barriers in the transition to the formal sector, with higher 
productivity and income. The second type is interregional segmentation, which is 
mainly due to the barriers of mobility of labour and other factors between 
regions. This double segmentation may be responsible for a great deal of the 
lower wage levels in regions more prone to generate informal jobs. As we 
mentioned above, this feature of the labour market of a developing country such 
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as Colombia has been ignored so far in studies analysing regional wage 
disparities. Our analysis in the following section aims at filling this gap. 
3. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
We use data from the second quarter of 2010 of the Colombian Household 
Survey (CHS), a repeated cross-section conducted by the Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), which is the governmental institute 
in charge of official statistics in Colombia.3 The survey gathers information about 
employment conditions for the population aged 12 and above including income, 
occupation and industry sector at two-digit level, in addition to the general 
population characteristics such as sex, age, marital status and educational 
attainment. The CHS is representative of the 13 major metropolitan areas in 
Colombia.  
The analysis is restricted to salary workers that were not carrying formal 
studies, aged between 15 and 60 years, and who reported working more than 16 
hours per week. We do not include self-employed workers and employers in the 
analysis because their source of income is a combination of labour and physical 
capital and, therefore, may not be compared with earnings of other employees. 
We also exclude public employees from the sample as their wages are fixed at the 
national level. After excluding observations with missing values or 
inconsistencies, 13,796 individuals remain in our sample. 
As for the measure of wages, we combine information from gross 
monthly wage earnings and worked hours to obtain gross hourly wages. A first 
look at the degree of regional wage differentials in Colombia is obtained from a 
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simple inspection of Table 1, which in the second column of data displays the 
average gross hourly wage. Large differences in average wages across the 13 
metropolitan areas are observed. For instance, the average wage in Cucuta, the 
metropolitan area with the lowest level, was 66.15% the average wage in Bogota, 
the metropolitan area with the highest level. As in previous studies, we attempt to 
control for price differentials by adjusting the nominal gross hourly wage using 
the deflator from the consumer price index of each city. Averages of the adjusted 
gross hourly wages are shown in the third column of Table 1. It is observed that 
the position in the regional ranking of wages is roughly the same and that the 
metropolitan areas in the top and the bottom of the ranking remain unchanged. 
The fact that the consumer price index is built with a fairly recent base year, 
2008, may explain the small variation obtained after controlling for difference in 
prices across the metropolitan areas. However, as far as we know this is the only 
information on regional prices available for Colombia.4 
The regional wage gap may be due to differences across metropolitan 
areas in workers’ characteristics. In particular, they are known to differ in the 
workers’ endowment of education, which is one of the essential determinants of 
wages. Table 1 shows the average years of education of workers in each 
metropolitan area. As can be seen, there are notable differences in education. On 
average, workers in Cartagena have more than two years of education over those 
in Cucuta. On the other hand, as has already been mentioned, previous studies 
for Colombia have shown that the incidence of informality varies considerable 
between regions. Since informal workers earn considerably lower wages than 
their formal counterparts, a metropolitan area with a higher proportion of 
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informal workers may have lower wages than a metropolitan area with a low 
proportion of informal workers. Moreover, informal workers tend to be 
concentrated in less-productive occupations. They are more likely to be salesmen, 
shop assistants, cooks, waiters, bartenders, bricklayers, carpenters or other 
construction workers. These occupations account for almost 40% of all informal 
workers. In this paper, we define workers as formal if they contribute both to 
health and old-age insurance. According to this legal definition, an informal job is 
an activity that is unregulated by the formal institutions and regulations of a 
country.5 Importantly, since data comes from a household survey and, therefore, 
the information relates only to workers and not to firms, the informal-sector 
term is related to the nature of the job and not to the firm in which the worker is 
employed. 
The percentage of informal workers in each of the metropolitan areas is 
included in the last column of Table 1. It is observed that the incidence of 
informality is very different across metropolitan areas. While Cucuta displays an 
informality of around 59%, the share of informal workers in Medellin is about 
19%. Interestingly, some metropolitan areas with the lowest average wages have 
the highest levels of informality (Villavicencio, Pasto and Cucuta). So, as 
expected, these simple descriptive figures suggest a negative correlation between 
the incidence of informality and hourly wages in the Colombian metropolitan 
areas.  
In order to make the analysis more manageable and for the sake of 
brevity, metropolitan areas were grouped into regions, following the classification 
suggested by DANE based on geographical proximity and natural characteristics. 
	 9 
We grouped Bogota, Medellin, and Cali into one region that we will refer to as 
the Golden Triangle.6 These metropolitan areas are the most productive and 
dynamic of the country. The most productive firms, most of R&D investments 
and the most highly skilled workers are concentrated in these three areas. Besides 
the Golden Triangle, the other metropolitan areas in the data set are grouped into 
five regions: Atlantic (Barranquilla, Cartagena and Monteria), Oriental (Cucuta, 
Bucaramanga and Villavicencio), Central (Manizales, Pereira and Ibague), and 
Pacific, comprising only Pasto. 
Table 2 provides a description of hourly wages for the five regions. 
Clearly, average hourly wages differ between regions, although the magnitude of 
the differences is lower than that found for the 13 metropolitan areas. The 
average hourly wage of the region with the lowest level, Pacific, is 74% of that in 
the region with the highest level, the Golden Triangle. So, by grouping 
metropolitan areas into regions disparities are attenuated, but they still remain 
sizeable. Apart from the differences in the mean, the wage distributions of these 
five regions present other interesting variations; for instance, Table 2 shows that 
regional wage distributions vary in terms of the degree of dispersion (standard 
deviation of the logarithm of wages and the Gini index). Interestingly, from the 
value of wages at the quartiles of the distribution (25th, 50th, 75th percentiles),7 
reported in the last block of columns of Table 2, it can be concluded that 
regional wage differentials are far from constant over the entire wage distribution, 
with symptoms of a non-monotonic behaviour. Summing up, evidence from 
Table 2 confirms that there are noticeable differences across regions in the entire 
wage distribution, and not just on average wages. To account for these 
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differences, in the rest of this paper we provide results for the average and the 
quartiles. 
As mentioned above, the spatial distribution of human capital, informality 
and other earning determinants are supposed to contribute to regional disparities 
in wages. A simple description of the amount of regional variability in 
characteristics is reported in Table 3. It is observed that regions with high levels 
of wages have workers employed in relatively larger firms and with a permanent 
contract. The proportion of workers employed in the sectors of industry and 
financial intermediation is larger in high-wage regions. Interestingly, informality 
also differs considerably between regions, ranging from 49% in Pacific to 23% in 
the Golden Triangle. These differences in the proportion of informal workers 
across regions might intensify regional wage differentials, since formal jobs 
usually entail higher wages than informal jobs. 
Therefore, we should conclude that there are differences between regions 
in characteristics that may result in regional wage differentials. In particular, data 
confirm that Colombian regions differ markedly in the endowment of education 
and in the share of informal jobs. Nevertheless, the key point is if these 
differences account for the bulk of regional wage disparities, or if part of the 
wage gap is produced by differences across regions in how these characteristics 
are rewarded. If regional wage gaps were completely explained by differences in 
the distribution of observable characteristics across regions, then under such 
circumstances, similar workers employed in similar firms but located in different 
regions would earn the same wage. On the contrary, if part of the wage gap could 
be explained by differences in how characteristics are rewarded, this could be 
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associated with failures in regional labour markets, as similar workers in 
comparable firms but in different regions would be earning different wages. In 
the sections that follow we aim to shed more light on this issue, paying particular 
attention to the role of differences in education and informality. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1.  Spec i f i cat ion o f  the Wage Equation 
The empirical strategy is based on a model in which the wage of individual i in 
region r is given by: 𝑊!" = 𝑋!"𝜷! + 𝜀!" (1) 
where 𝑊!" denotes the log of the hourly wage of individual i in region r. Xir 
denotes the set of characteristics that affect the wage of this individual, including 
years of education, experience (and its square), tenure (and its square), gender, 
sector of employment, marital status, head of household, hours worked, type of 
contract, size of the firm and firm sector. β r is the vector of prices or returns at 
region r associated with the characteristics in Xir. Equation (1) is estimated for 
each region, so that it is consistent with interregional segmentation, i.e. with 
workers with similar characteristics obtaining different returns across regions.  
The analysis from equation (1) is based on the mean distribution of wages. 
However, the descriptive in the previous section showed that regional disparities 
are far from uniform over the entire wage distribution. Therefore, it is of interest 
to know the effect of variables such as education and informality at different 
points of the distribution of wages. This can be done by means of the conditional 
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quantile regression (CQR) model introduced by Koenker & Bassett (1978). If the 
conditional effect of a specific variable in Xr varies over the levels of other 
covariates in Xr, the estimator based on the CQR may be a consistent estimator 
of its conditional effect at the mean values of the other k-1 remaining covariates, 
but it is not a consistent estimator of the effect on the unconditional wage 
distribution (e.g. Borah & Basu, 2013). It is possible to estimate the unconditional 
quantile effect of each variable in Xr using the approach proposed by Firpo et al. 
(2009) based on the influence function (IF) and recentred influence function 
(RIF). In the context of wages, the IF is: 𝐼𝐹 𝑊!; 𝑞! = (𝜏 − 𝐼 𝑊! ≤ 𝑞! ) 𝑓!! 𝑞!  (3) 
where 𝑞!  refers to the τ-th unconditional quantile of wages, 𝑓!! 𝑞!  is the 
probability density function of 𝑊! evaluated at 𝑞!, and 𝐼 𝑊! ≤ 𝑞!  is an indicator 
variable to denote whether a value of 𝑊! is less than 𝑞! or not. By definition the 
RIF is equal to: 𝑅𝐼𝐹 𝑊!; 𝑞! = 𝑞! + 𝐼𝐹 𝑊!; 𝑞!  (4) 
Firpo et al. (2009) demonstrate that the implementation of the UQR is 
straightforward and similar to the OLS regression. For a specific quantile τ, the 
first step is to estimate the RIF of the τ-th quantile of 𝑊! following equations (3) 
and (4). The second step is to run OLS regression of the 𝑅𝐼𝐹 𝑊!"; 𝑞!  on the 
observed covariates, Xir: 𝐸[𝑅𝐼𝐹 𝑊!"; 𝑞!|X!" ] = 𝑋!"𝜷𝝉𝒓 (5) 
Coefficients 𝜷!"  represent the approximate marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on the unconditional quantile 𝑞! of wages for workers in 
region r. 
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It can be reasonably argued that two sources of bias may affect the 
estimation of the wage equations. One is related to sample selection due to the 
employment status. It arises because some unobserved characteristics could be 
correlated with the likelihood of both employment and wages. Another source of 
sample selection comes from the probability of being a migrant as long as 
unobservable factors that affect the probability to migrate correlate with wages. 
Although both sources of selection may lead to biased results, there are two 
reasons why they are not controlled for in the results reported in this study. The 
first one is that previous analyses that have controlled for employment selection 
in Colombia have found that results are not strongly affected (Quiñones & 
Rodriguez, 2011). We get the same conclusion when the wage equations for the 
Colombian macro-regions were estimated controlling for selection (results are 
available upon request). On the other hand, internal migration in Colombia has 
been found to be relatively low, so that this source of selection does not seem to 
be especially relevant (Ortiz et al., 2008).8 Also, it is worth to mention that the 
aim of this study is to analyse wage differences between workers in different 
regions rather than between workers in the formal and informal sectors in each 
region. That is the reason why the wage equation for each region is estimated 
pooling observations corresponding to both formal and informal workers, in a 
specification that includes a dummy variable to control for the type of job 
(formal or informal). This means that our strategy is different to the one in, for 
instance, Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014), as they estimate separate wage 
equations for the two groups of workers under analysis: private and public 
sectors workers. It is the distinction between the two groups of workers what 
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force them to control for endogenous classification in each sector by means of an 
endogenous switching regression model. In contrast, in our case it makes no 
sense to control for selection (into the formal or informal sectors) by estimating 
an endogenous switching model, because this will force us to analyse separately 
regional wage disparities of formal and informal workers. Results on the 
contribution of regional differences in the incidence of informality could not be 
obtained in that case.9 
Another source of bias is the well-known endogeneity of the measure of 
education caused by unobserved characteristics, such as ability and quality of 
education and/or measurement errors. As in previous studies, this problem is 
hard to address due to the lack of appropriate instruments in the data set, and the 
impossibility to control for individual unobserved effects in a cross-section 
setting. Accordingly, one should be cautious in interpreting the estimates as 
causal effects. In any case, it is worth taking into account that most studies using 
estimation methods that account for endogeneity have provided estimates of the 
returns to schooling that exceed somewhat those obtained when not controlling 
for endogeneity. Therefore, we could expect an increase in the estimate of the 
return to education in all regions that, in any case, would not change dramatically 
the estimate of differences between regions. 
Finally, it should be noted that the identification of the individual effect 
on wages of education and informality requires that they be not highly correlated.	
We explored this issue and realised that the degree of association between our 
measures of education and informality is moderate in the sample of workers in 
each region. The correlation coefficients are not high; they range from 0.31 to 
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0.43. In addition, we observed that the mapping between the endowment of 
education and the incidence of informality at the regional level is far from 
perfect. To do so, we compared the two aggregate magnitudes for the Colombian 
cities, obtaining that informality was high in cities with a small endowment of 
education and also in cities in which the endowment of education was large. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the amount of overlapping in the information 
contained in the two magnitudes is not very high. This evidence, combined with 
the fact that we use large sample sizes (which means high sample variability) to 
estimate the wage equations lead us to conclude that our estimates should be 
providing precise enough estimates of the effects of education and informality.10 
4.2.  Decomposi t ion o f  Regional  Wage Gaps 
The Blinder–Oaxaca method uses the estimation of the wage equation in (1) to 
decompose the mean wage gap between a high-wage region (r = h) and a low-
wage region (r = l) as follows: 𝑊! −𝑊! = (𝑋!−𝑋!)𝜷! − 𝑋!(𝜷𝒉 − 𝜷𝒍) (6) 
The first term in the RHS of this expression corresponds to the difference 
in the average values of observed worker and firm characteristics between 
regions h and l, whereas the second term is the part of the wage gap attributable 
to differences in the estimated coefficients, i.e. differences in the wage structure.11  
Similarly, Firpo et al. (2009) proposed a decomposition of the wage 
differential at quantile τ using the RIF regression estimates. Any distributional 
parameter, such as a wage quantile, can be written as a function 𝑞!(𝐹!) of the 
cumulative distribution of wages, 𝐹!(𝑊). For example, the difference in a wage 
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quantile τ between a high-wage region and a low-wage region, ∆!! , can be written 
as: ∆!!= 𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!! − 𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!!   
(7) ∆!!= 𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!! − 𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!! + [𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!! − 𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!! ] ∆!!=                             ∆!!!                    +                           ∆!!!    
where 𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!!  indicates the actual wage quantile of workers belonging and 
rewarded under the wage structure of region r = h. 𝑞! 𝐹!!|!!!  represents the 
counterfactual wage quantile, that is the wage quantile that would prevail if 
workers observed in the region with high wages, r = h, had been paid under the 
wage structure of workers in the low-wage region, r = l. Using the actual and 
counterfactual wage quantile for each region, it is possible to decompose the 
wage gap at any quantile,  ∆!! , in two terms, one which captures the wage 
structure effect, ∆!!! , and another that represents the endowments effect, ∆!!! . 
However, if the true conditional expectation is not linear, the 
decomposition based on a linear regression may be biased (Barsky et al., 2002). A 
reweighted procedure coupled with the RIF regressions can solve this problem 
(Fortin et al., 2011). First, a reweighting factor is calculated as: 
Ψ 𝑋 = Pr 𝑟 = ℎ X /Pr (𝑟 = ℎ)Pr 𝑟 = 𝑙 X /Pr (𝑟 = 𝑙)  (8) 
Then, RIF regressions are computed for workers in regions l, h and for 
the counterfactual lc region, using the weights in Ψ 𝑋 , to later calculate this 
decomposition: ∆!!= 𝑋!𝜷𝝉𝒉 − 𝑋!!𝜷𝝉𝒍𝒄 + 𝑋!!𝜷𝝉𝒍𝒄 − 𝑋!𝜷𝝉𝒍  (9) 
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∆!!=                ∆!!!            +                ∆!!!              
where 𝑋! denotes the vector of means in region r (=l and h), and 𝑋!! are the 
counterfactual means for region l using the reweighting factor in (8) to make the 
distribution of the characteristics, X, in the region with low wages similar to that 
of the region with high wages. 
The wage structure effect can be divided into a pure wage structure effect 
and a reweighting error: ∆!!! = 𝑋!(𝜷𝝉𝒉 − 𝜷𝝉𝒍𝒄 )+ (𝑋! − 𝑋!!)𝜷𝝉𝒍𝒄  
(10) ∆!!!  =           ∆!,!!!          +           ∆!,!!!   
The reweighting error goes to zero as 𝑋!!⟶ 𝑋!. Similarly, the composition effect 
can be divided into a pure composition effect and a specification error (which 
should be zero as long as the model is linear): 
 
The pure wage structure and composition effects in (10) and (11) can be 
decomposed into the contribution corresponding to each characteristic. In 
particular, our empirical exercise isolates the specific contribution of education 
and informality. 
The procedure for decomposing the regional wage gaps entails two 
assumptions. First, the similarity of the conditional distribution of unobservable 
characteristics affecting wages in the corresponding regions and, therefore, that 
neither the wage structure nor the composition component is confounded by 
differences between regions in the conditional distributions of unobservables. 
∆!!!= (𝑋!! − 𝑋!)𝜷𝝉𝒍𝒄 + 𝑋! (𝜷𝝉𝒍𝒄 − 𝜷𝝉𝒍)  (11) ∆!!!=             ∆!,!!!      +         ∆!,!!!  
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Second, the overlapping of the distribution of the observable characteristics for 
the two regions for which the gap is decomposed (i.e. existence of a common 
support). As indicated in Nicolic et al. (2014), the main shortcoming of the 
approach is that it provides only local linear approximations to the effects of 
(possibly large) changes in characteristics and returns. 
5. Results 
5.1.  OLS and Quanti l e  Regress ion Est imates  
Table 4 reports estimates of the effect of education and informal work at the 
mean (OLS) and at the quartiles for the five regions and Colombia as a whole.12 
All the variables described in Table 3 were included as control variables and the 
corresponding estimated coefficients are in Table A1 in the online Appendix. 
The OLS estimates of the return to schooling for each region and the entire 
country are displayed in the first column of the upper panel. Results confirm that, 
for Colombia as a whole, investments in education are quite profitable, since the 
estimated return is 7.42%, and highly significant. This is also so in the five 
regions under analysis although, as expected, there are significant differences 
across them in the return to years of education. A higher return to schooling is 
observed in those regions with the highest level of wages: 8.14% and 8.26% in 
Atlantic and the Golden Triangle, respectively. In turn, regions with the lowest 
levels of hourly wages display the lowest returns to schooling: 5.57% in Oriental 
and 6.82% in Pacific. Differences across regions in the return to schooling are 
confirmed by the result of a Wald test. The value of the statistic, displayed in 
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Table 4, leads to the clear rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of returns. 
Thus, in addition to differences in the endowment of education, returns to 
schooling may be thought to be an important factor in explaining regional wage 
gaps. 
The OLS estimates of the informal pay penalty, reported in the first 
column of the lower panel of Table 4, show a more complex pattern. The Pacific 
region, which is the region with the lowest wage level, is the one with the highest 
pay penalty; an informal worker earns 26.8% less than an otherwise similar 
formal worker in that region. However, the next region in the pay penalty ranking 
is that with the highest wage level, the Golden Triangle, with an estimated penalty 
of 13.56%. Even though the pay penalty is considerably larger in the region with 
the lowest level of wages compared to the region with the highest, there seems to 
be no clear pattern between the informal pay penalty and the regional wage gap. 
In any case, the OLS results suggest that Colombian regions differ not only in the 
incidence of informality but also in the mean wages earned by otherwise similar 
formal and informal workers. This is confirmed by the result of the Wald test 
reported in Table 4. Even though the null hypothesis of equality in the effect of 
informality is rejected with a p-value slightly above 5%, pairwise tests reveal that 
the difference is highly significant between the effect in Pacific and the other 
Colombian regions. 
The UQR estimates of the returns to schooling and the informality pay 
penalty are summarized in the last three columns in Table 4. They reveal a 
heterogeneous pattern in the return to schooling along the unconditional wage 
distribution. The estimated return in the country as a whole is as low as 1.39% in 
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the first quartile, increases to 3.74% in the middle of the distribution, and rises 
sharply in the third quartile, up to 12.54%. This means that the wage increase 
caused by an additional year of education in Colombia is tenfold higher at the 
upper part of the wage distribution than at the bottom. In other words, education 
clearly seems to contribute to increasing wage inequality. A similar pattern is 
observed in all regions, although the increase in the return is more pronounced in 
some and less in others. Another interesting feature derived from the UQR 
results is that the return to schooling at the middle of the distribution is similar – 
and even lower in the case of Pacific – to that at the bottom, in regions with low 
wage levels. Therefore, increasing education does not raise intra-regional 
inequality at the middle-bottom part of the distribution in low-wage regions. This 
feature is not observed in regions with high wages, in which the return increases 
monotonically along the three quartiles. 
As for the effect of informality along the unconditional distribution, the 
UQR estimates suggest that, in the country as a whole, working in the informal 
sector reduces wages of workers with the lowest earnings by almost 19%, while 
the reduction is about 9% for workers with median wages. In turn, the pay 
penalty is only marginally significant for workers at the upper end of the 
distribution of wages. A similar pattern is observed in all regions with the 
exception of Pacific. In the Colombian region with the highest incidence of 
informality, the pay penalty is roughly similar all along the distribution of wages. 
This means that in Pacific, informality reduces wages of workers with low, 
medium and high wage levels by about 30%. It is also worthy to note that the pay 
penalty in that region is higher than in any other region all over the distribution. 
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Altogether, the UQR estimates suggest that reducing informality would 
contribute to decreased within-region inequality, by increasing wages at the 
bottom and middle part of the distribution more than for workers with higher 
wages. The strength of this effect varies somewhat across regions, being more 
intense in those in which informal workers are more abundant. The exception to 
this general pattern is Pacific, the region ranking first in incidence of informality 
that, in any case, is the region with the strongest effect of informality on wages. 
The effect of education and informality varies significantly across regions 
in each of the quartiles. The results of Wald tests for each quartile based on the 
UQR regression estimates clearly lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
equality of the returns to schooling. The same applies to the effect of informality 
at the highest and lowest quartiles, but not at the median. Nonetheless, results of 
the Wald test reported in Table 4 correspond to the UQR estimation that pools 
observations for all regions, which means that they correspond to the effects on 
the unconditional wage distribution in the whole country rather than in each 
particular region. In other words, the result of the Wald statistic in each quartile 
may be seen as a lower bound of a test of equality of the effects based on the 
UQR estimates. 
Summing up, the estimates in this section confirm, on the one hand, the 
positive effect of education on wages, which increases along the wage 
distribution, and the existence of substantial regional variability in the returns to 
schooling. On the other hand, results corroborate that workers face different 
informal pay penalties throughout the territory, which affects mostly individuals 
with low wages (which is consistent with the fact that informal workers 
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concentrate at the bottom of the wage distribution). 13  This supports the 
hypothesis that regional differences in the effect of education may explain 
regional disparities mostly at the upper part of the wage distribution, whereas 
differences in the informal pay penalty would be behind those observed at the 
bottom. 
5.2.  Decomposi t ion o f  Regional  Wage Gaps 
Following the method sketched in section 4.2, the decomposition of regional 
wage differentials in Colombia is analysed by considering the difference between 
the Golden Triangle, the region with the highest level of wages, and the other 
regions. The regional wage differentials relative to the Golden Triangle for the 
mean and the quartiles are reported in the first row of information for each 
region in Table 5, followed by the results of the global and detailed 
decompositions. Given our goal in this paper, the details of the specific 
contribution of education and informality are presented in Table 5, while the 
contributions of the other observable characteristics have been grouped in the 
term labelled rest. 
Wage differentials between the Golden Triangle and each of the other 
four regions, calculated at the mean, are all statistically significant. The highest 
wage gap (measured in logarithmic points) is found in the Pacific region, while 
the lowest is that of Atlantic. Interestingly, differences in the size of the gap along 
the distribution are observed between Pacific and Oriental, the regions with 
lowest wage levels, and Atlantic and Central, which are the regions with wages 
close to those in the Golden Triangle. Wage differentials follow a sort of U-shape 
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in the case of the first two regions, whereas they increase monotonically over the 
distribution in the case of the latter group.14 The decomposition shows that these 
two groups also differ in the origin of the gap. Results from the global 
decomposition reveal that 0.207 logarithmic points (l.p.) out of the 0.362 l.p. of 
the mean gap for Pacific are attributable to differences in observed characteristics 
between this region and the Golden Triangle. The contribution of this 
component is even larger in the case of Oriental, where 0.171 l.p. out of 0.19 l.p. 
correspond to differences in characteristics. The decomposition of the gap at the 
different quartiles indicates that the role of differences in characteristics is 
especially strong at the bottom and at the top of the distribution, particularly in 
Pacific. 
In sharp contrast, the bulk of the wage gap between Atlantic and Central, 
and the Golden Triangle cannot be explained by differences in observed 
characteristics. Only 0.036 l.p. out of 0.119 l.p. of the wage gap in the Central 
region is explained by characteristics. In the case of Atlantic, results even suggest 
that the average wage would have been higher than in the Golden Triangle (by 
0.021 l.p.) if the two regions had had the same wage structure. The analysis of the 
global decomposition at the quartiles for these regions indicates that differences 
in wage structures widen the gap at the middle and, particularly, at the top of the 
wage distribution (0.004 l.p. in the first versus 0144 l.p. in the last quartile in 
Atlantic, and 0.069 l.p. and 0.138 l.p. respectively in Central). Therefore, the 
global decomposition reveals that the origin of the much lower wages in Pacific 
and Oriental is essentially on their lower endowment of characteristics that 
favour high wages, whereas wage differentials in regions with wage levels closer 
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to those in the Golden Triangle can be explained almost completely by 
differences in returns to characteristics (wage structure), which are higher in the 
benchmark region. 
From the detailed decomposition, it is observed that differences in years 
of schooling and in the incidence of informality greatly contributed to widen the 
gap in Pacific. To be sure, 0.065 l.p. of the mean wage gap between this region 
and the Golden Triangle corresponds to the higher level of education of the 
working population in the latter region, whereas differences in the share of 
informal work account for 0.066 l.p. A similar portion (0.067 l.p.) is attributable 
to education in the case of Oriental, though the contribution of informality is 
lower in this case (0.017 l.p.). As for the regions in which the gap is narrower, the 
contribution of differences in education and informality is less intense. Actually, 
the better endowment of education in Atlantic with respect to the Golden 
Triangle reduces the magnitude of the wage gap by 0.021 l.p. 
The detailed decomposition at the different quartiles supports one of the 
major hypotheses in this paper, which is that differences across regions in the 
level of education provoke regional disparities at the upper end of the 
distribution, whereas differences in informality explain a large part of the gap at 
the bottom. This feature is particularly intense in the regions with the widest 
wage gaps. In Pacific, differences in the endowment of education with respect to 
the Golden Triangle account for 0.105 l.p. of the gap at the third quartile and 
only 0.023 l.p. at the first. The same applies to Oriental (0.113 l.p. in the third and 
0.014 l.p. in the first quartile). Remarkably, differences in returns to schooling, 
reported in section 5.1, also contribute greatly to the wage gap at the upper part 
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of the distribution in these two regions. The joint effect attributable to 
differences in the endowment and in the return to education (0.548 l.p. in Pacific 
and 0.563 l.p. in Oriental) exceeds by a large amount the observed wage gap in 
the upper quartile, meaning that in the absence of other mechanisms, it would 
have been even wider in these two regions. 
Regarding the effect of differences in the share of informal jobs, it is 
observed how it concentrates at the bottom end of the distribution in all regions, 
with almost no effect for median and top wages. In this respect, the results for 
Pacific are of particular interest, since they show the highest incidence of 
informality and the widest wage gap among Colombian regions. One-third of the 
wage gap at the first quartile in Pacific is explained by differences in informality 
between this region and the Golden Triangle (the part explained by differences in 
the share of informal workers is 0.165, which corresponds to 33% of 0.499). In 
turn, the contribution of this component is a bit less than 0.05 l.p. at the median, 
and negligible at the third quartile. In addition, the higher pay penalty suffered by 
informal workers in Pacific, in comparison with their counterparts in the Golden 
Triangle, increases the wage gap by 0.117 l.p. at the first quartile, but only 0.034 
l.p. at the median and by a non-significant amount at the third quartile. Overall, 
the total effect linked to informality at the bottom quartile in Pacific amounts to 
as much as 0.282 l.p., which represents more than 56% of the gap for workers 
earning the lower wages. 
Finally, Table 5 also reports the contribution of the reweighting and 
specification errors. The former is small in magnitude and not significant in most 
cases. As for the latter, a significant contribution of the departure from linearity is 
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only observed in a few cases: the lowest quartile in Oriental, and the median in 
Central and Pacific. In these cases, the contribution of the specification error is 
intense in magnitude, exceeding even that of education and informality. 
Therefore, although there seems not to be a systematic pattern in this error term, 
one should accept with some caution the specific results for the above-
mentioned cases. 
Summing up, results of the gap decomposition confirm that differences 
across regions in both education and informality play a prominent role in 
explaining regional wage gaps. However, and beyond this general statement, the 
evidence reported in this section probes that the effect of differences in 
education on regional wage gaps is concentrated in the upper part of the wage 
distribution, whereas that of informality basically affects workers at the bottom. 
5.3.  Results  by Gender 
The analysis so far did not distinguish by gender. However, it is known that 
women and men behave differently in the labour market. In particular, the 
international evidence suggests that the return to education is higher for female 
than for male workers (e.g. Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004), while it is also 
likely that the incidence of informality varies between women and men. 15 
Therefore, it is worthwhile checking if the evidence derived so far for the whole 
sample of workers also applies for both genders. It needs to be noted that we are 
interested in ascertaining whether the features described in the former case apply 
also to the latter, rather than in testing for gender differences within each region. 
To save space, we only report results of the wage gap decomposition for women 
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and men. Those corresponding to the estimates of the returns to schooling and 
the informality pay penalty are available from the authors upon request. In any 
case, it should be mentioned that, consistent with the previous literature, a higher 
return to education is estimated for females in all regions – in the mean and in all 
the quartiles. Interestingly, the pay penalty of informality is, in general, also 
higher for females. 
 Results in Table 6 show that the main features detected for the entire 
sample are also observed when the regional wage gap decompositions are 
computed separately for female and male workers. In the first place, the 
prominent role of the contribution of differences in characteristics in Pacific and 
Oriental is common to both genders. However, this component cannot explain 
the bulk of the wage gap in Atlantic and Central, neither for females nor for 
males. Therefore, similar to that described in the previous section for the entire 
sample, the evidence suggests that, for both females and males, the gap in the 
regions with the lowest wage levels, Pacific and Oriental, is the consequence of 
their poorer endowment of characteristics that favour higher wages. In contrast, 
the difference in the wage structure accounts for most of the gap of women and 
men in the regions with wage levels closer to those in the Golden Triangle 
(Atlantic and Central). 
As for the particular contribution of education and informality, beyond some 
specific differences between the two genders, results in Table 6 are also 
consistent with those commented for the entire sample. The contribution of the 
endowment of education is stronger in the upper part of the distribution for both 
genders, though particularly so in the case of men. In turn, the contribution of 
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informality is concentrated at the bottom for females and males. Finally, 
differences in the return to education for males exert a large effect at the top of 
their wage distribution in Pacific and Oriental. The contribution of this 
component is even stronger for female workers in these poor regions. The same 
applies to the case of Atlantic and Central, although in this case the contribution 
is stronger for males. 
 All in all, the analysis of the regional wage gaps separately for women and 
men supports the role played by differences in education and informality. It also 
confirms that the contribution of these two characteristics is concentrated in 
different parts of the wage distribution.  
6. Conclusions 
We have reported evidence that confirms that spatial differences in education 
and informal work explain a large part of regional wage disparities in an emerging 
country such as Colombia. The analysis of the entire wage distribution permitted 
us to probe that differences in education across Colombian regions account for 
gaps at the upper end of the wage distribution. Meanwhile, the evidence supports 
that the effect of differences in informal work is limited to workers with medium 
and low wages. We must admit that results are consistent with an explanation of 
the regional heterogeneity in the returns to schooling based on the effect of 
unobserved ability and quality of education. It is sensible to think that the most 
productive and prosperous territories offer greater opportunities, and thus attract 
the ablest individuals and also those whose education is of superior quality. If the 
wage effect of these unobserved characteristics is incorporated into the estimated 
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return to schooling, one would expect higher estimated returns in the most 
developed regions, which is what our results reveal. At any rate, we believe the 
magnitude of territorial disparities in the estimated effect of education and 
informality is large enough to allow us to conclude that they exert a substantial 
contribution in explaining regional wage gaps in an emerging country such as 
Colombia. 
The evidence from Colombia leads to the conclusion that policies aiming 
at stimulating investments in human capital in the less-developed regions will 
help to decrease regional wage gaps, especially in the upper part of the wage 
distribution. However, equalizing years of education across regions would not be 
enough to reduce regional wage disparities due to large differences in returns to 
schooling at higher quantiles. Meanwhile, policies that point towards the 
reduction of informality will help to reduce regional wage gaps at the bottom end 
of the wage distribution, particularly for those regions with sizeable informality. 
In addition, evidence has been obtained suggesting that improvements in the 
level of education will lead to increasing within-region inequality, due to the fact 
that the return is higher for high wage levels than for workers with medium and 
low wages. Interestingly, the lesson from the Colombian case is that successful 
policies to reduce informality in the labour market will contribute to narrowing 
regional wage gaps, particularly at the bottom of the distribution, while 
simultaneously helping to decrease within-region inequality. This is so since the 
wage effect of decreasing informality is stronger for low than for high wage 
levels. 
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Notes																																																								
1. The strong performance of Colombia’s economy in the last decade has contributed to a decline in 
unemployment, informality, inequality and poverty. During most of the 2000s, Colombia benefited from 
growing external demand, high commodity prices, and abundant FDI. Confidence in the government’s 
macroeconomic policies and the improvement in the security situation led to an impressive rise in private 
investment in general, and in foreign direct investment in particular. However, as indicated in the World 
Bank’s Colombia – Second Programmatic Sustained Growth and Income Convergence Development Policy Loan Project 
‘the country faces considerable challenges to boost and sustain growth: (i) access to finance for firms and 
infrastructure investment is low and narrow compared to regional peers, limiting effective capital 
accumulation, and infrastructure provision; (ii) lack of adequate education and professional skills and skill 
matching mechanisms contribute to low levels of labor productivity, and weak labor market outcomes; 
(iii) the country lacks a coherent and integrated innovation financing system that will encourage 
productivity gains and sophistication of firms over time; and (iv) regulations and procedures increase 
business costs, limiting trade activities.’ (2015, page 2). 
2. Pereira and Galego (2015) perform a similar analysis for the Portuguese regions, although they focus on 
intra-regional wage inequality.  
3. We used the last wave of the CHS that was available when this study was initiated. An inspection of the 
data available for other years suggests that using this information rather than that for 2010 had led to 
results similar to the ones reported in this paper. The same applies with respect to the data for the other 
quarters of the year used in the study. We decided not to pool the data for different quarters to prevent 
further complications with the decomposition in case of including controls for each quarter. We also 
wanted to avoid the problem caused by the inclusion in the sample of different observations 
corresponding to the same individual. Since it is not possible to identify individuals in the different 
quarters, the treatment of observations corresponding to the same individuals is not feasible. In any case, 
there is no reason to expect differences in the results when pooling the sample for the four quarters, 
whereas it should be stressed that the number of observations available for each quarter is large enough to 
guarantee the quality of the estimates. On the other hand, as pointed out in the introduction, the fall in 
inequality happened during the first decade of the century in many Latin American countries. In the 
Colombian case the decline in income inequality was not stable until 2007 and subsequent years. 
However, in 2008 the Colombian economy was hit by the economic crisis, and after 2010 it experienced 
an economic boom. Therefore, in our view 2010 is a year that may reflect the standard performance of the 
Colombian economy and in which there was also a fall in inequality. 
4. A similar procedure has been applied in, for instance, Pereira & Galego (2014).  5 	The definition of the Seventeenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians of informal 
employment is ¨based on the characteristics of the individual’s employment, job or position. A worker has 
an informal job if the employment relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to national labour or 
social legislation. This condition of informal employment is observed in persons employed in both formal 
and informal enterprises, as well as in those employed in domestic service by households¨ (ILO, 2011).	
6. Colombia's Golden Triangle refers to an urban region, limited by a triangle whose vertexes are defined 
by the three largest cities: Bogotá, Medellin and Cali. In our particular case, we are not referring to the 
region, but only to the three cities that demarcate the triangle. 
7. In order to save space we do not reproduce here results for other percentiles, although they are 
available upon request. In any case, including results corresponding to more percentiles does not modify 
the general conclusions regarding regional disparities over the entire wage distribution.  
8. See Pereira & Galego (2014) for similar arguments in the case of Portugal. 
9. In any case, it should be acknowledged that endogeneity of informality is likely to be an issue. We 
explored the possibility of instrumenting this variable, using some household characteristics (similar to 
those used in the previous literature dealing with selection bias due to endogenous classification). 
Unfortunately, the test statistics revealed that instruments were weak in all cases, resulting in unreliable 
estimates. 
10. We would like to note that a similar concern could be formulated as regards any estimate reported in 
the literature on the effect of the set of characteristics included in a wage equation (public/private sector, 
education, firm size, etc.). We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.	
11. The Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition has been applied in several studies analysing wage gaps by 
gender, race, public and private sector, etc. It has also been applied recently for understanding regional 
wage gaps (García & Molina, 2002; Motellón et al, 2011; Pereira & Galego, 2014; Galego & Pereira, 2014) 
and regional differences in wage inequality (e.g. Pereira & Galego, 2015).	
12. Estimates were also obtained for other percentiles. They are not reported here to save space but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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13. The share of informal employment in the lowest quartile of wage distribution ranges from about 40% 
in the Golden Triangle to 70% in Oriental. In turn, these shares are about 10% and 30% respectively in 
the upper quartile. An anonymous referee kindly suggested this explanation.		
14. Motellón et al. (2011) found an increasing wage differential across the distribution for Spain and 
Pereira & Gallego (2014) found the same pattern for Portugal. Such a non-monotonic increase of the gap 
along the distribution is only observed for the most developed areas in Colombia. 
15. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the separate analysis by gender. As a side effect, it 
may be assumed that any concern about sample selection is mitigated when analysing women and men 
separately. 
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Table 1. Hourly wage, informality and human capital in the largest Colombian metro-
areas. 	
  
Number of 
Observations 
Nominal Gross 
Hourly  wage 
Adjusted 
Hourly  
wage 
Schooling Informality 
    (pesos) (pesos) (years) (%) 
      Barranquilla 1037 3663.16 3510.73 11.31 35.29 
  
(2947.25) (2824.61) (3.45) (0.015) 
Cartagena 809 3760.54 3605.99 11.74 22.00 
  
(2518.59) (2415.08) (3.44) (0.015) 
Monteria 759 3650.30 3493.12 11.26 36.89 
  
(3218.13) (3079.56) (3.59) (0.018) 
Cucuta 754 2825.23 2634.22 9.39 59.15 
  
(1837.99) (1713.73) (4.07) (0.018) 
Bucaramanga 988 3662.94 3442.25 10.65 31.88 
  
(2562.04) (2407.68) (3.87) (0.015) 
Villavicencio 862 3306.05 3141.81 10.11 43.85 
  
(2464.41) (2341.98) (3.48) (0.017) 
Manizales 1109 3506.84 3402.62 11.19 20.83 
  
(2680.53) (2600.87) (3.74) (0.012) 
Pereira 1014 3351.98 3230.37 10.24 28.60 
  
(2547.55) (2455.12) (3.89) (0.014) 
Ibague 869 3678.27 3501.31 11.06 36.02 
  
(2913.20) (2773.05) (3.73) (0.016) 
Pasto 733 2981.61 2885.20 10.53 49.39 
  
(2668.21) (2581.93) (4.14) (0.018) 
Medellin 1913 3903.84 3718.43 10.96 18.98 
  
(2904.72) (2766.76) (3.76) (0.009) 
Bogota 1754 4305.70 4132.05 11.33 23.95 
  
(3566.44) (3422.61) (3.96) (0.010) 
Cali 1195 3872.52 3745.43 10.68 28.62 
 
 
(3147.60) (3044.30) (3.83) 
 (0.013) 
 
Colombia 13796 3662.54 3504.48 10.86 31.05 
    (2894.79) (2773.67) (3.82)  (0.004) 
 
Note: Sample means. Standard deviation is shown in parenthesis.  
  
 Table 2. Descriptive of adjusted hourly wages (pesos) in the five regions of Colombia. 	
        Quartiles 
  Average 
Std. Dev. 
of Logs Gini 25th 50th 75th 
Atlantic 3535.18 0.57 0.33 2395.67 2617.42 3727.07 
Oriental 3108.82 0.54 0.31 2000.76 2489.83 3321.36 
Central 3372.9 0.54 0.32 2144.57 2467.86 3489.06 
Pacific 2885.19 0.69 0.39 1458.48 2325.62 3010.51 
Golden Triangle 3874.31 0.57 0.34 2384.57 2778.14 4167.22 
 	 	
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive of worker and firm characteristics. 	
  Atlantic Oriental Central Pacific 
Golden 
Triangle 
Adjusted  Hourly Wage (pesos) 3535.18 3108.82 3372.9 2885.19 3874.28 
 
Informal workers 0.32 0.44 0.28 0.49 0.23 
 
Worker´s  charac t e r i s t i c s  
     Schooling (years) 11.43 10.10 10.83 10.53 11.03 
Experience (years) 18.02 17.09 18.55 17.99 18.05 
Tenure (months) 53.91 36.92 48.57 44.74 50.21 
Women 0.39 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.45 
Married 0.60 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.51 
Head of household 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.44 
 
Type  o f  contrac t  
     No-contract 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.43 0.23 
Temporary 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.24 
Permanent 0.54 0.36 0.50 0.29 0.52 
 
Firm s ize  
     Micro 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.50 0.28 
Small 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.20 
Medium 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Large 0.46 0.31 0.44 0.32 0.45 
 
Sec tor  
     Mining, electricity, gas and water 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Industry 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.26 
Construction 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Sales, Hotels and Restaurants 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.27 
Transportation 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 
Financial Intermediation 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.15 
Social Services 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.17 
      Observat ions  2605 2604 2992 733 4862 
 
Notes: Sample means. All figures in %, excepting those indicated in parenthesis. 
  
 Table 4. Estimated returns to education and informality for the five regions 
of Colombia. 	
      UQR 
  OLS   25th 50th 75th 
Years  o f  educat ion  
     
      Atlantic 0.0826** 
 
0.0087** 0.0435** 0.1319** 
 
[0.0028] 
 
[0.0012] [0.0025] [0.0056] 
Oriental 0.0557** 
 
0.0215** 0.0253** 0.0740** 
 
[0.0027] 
 
[0.0036] [0.0022] [0.0046] 
Central 0.0752** 
 
0.0214** 0.0306** 0.1148** 
 
[0.0024] 
 
[0.0024] [0.0016] [0.0048] 
Pacific 0.0682** 
 
0.0419** 0.0288** 0.0899** 
 
[0.0050] 
 
[0.0099] [0.0051] [0.0079] 
Golden Tr. 0.0814** 
 
0.0118** 0.0519** 0.1617** 
 
[0.0020] 
 
[0.0011] [0.0019] [0.0047] 
Colombia 0.0742** 
 
0.0139** 0.0374** 0.1254** 
 
[0.0012] 
 
[0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0024] 
      
Test of equal effects 16.87**  6.27** 5.18** 18.34** 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
      
In formal  
     
      Atlantic -0.1023** 
 
-0.1137** -0.0874** -0.0472 
 
[0.0257] 
 
[0.0138] [0.0258] [0.0525] 
Oriental -0.0991** 
 
-0.2710** -0.0810** 0.0123 
 
[0.0257] 
 
[0.0355] [0.0231] [0.0445] 
Central -0.0951** 
 
-0.2389** -0.0572** 0.0414 
 
[0.0274] 
 
[0.0326] [0.0215] [0.0493] 
Pacific -0.2680** 
 
-0.3085* -0.3499** -0.2939** 
 
[0.0558] 
 
[0.1200] [0.0642] [0.0868] 
Golden Tr. -0.1356** 
 
-0.1473** -0.0470+ -0.0215 
 
[0.0227] 
 
[0.0147] [0.0249] [0.0487] 
Colombia -0.1430** 
 
-0.1881** -0.0917** -0.0471+ 
  [0.0125]   [0.0109] [0.0118] [0.0242] 
      
Test of equal effects 2.35+  2.42* 1.39 2.55* 
 (0.0522)  (0.0461) (0.2346) (0.0373) 
 
Notes: Experience (and its square), tenure (and its square), gender, marital status, head of 
household, hours worked, type of contract, size of the firm and firm sector are included as 
controls. Standard errors in brackets. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. OLS refers to the ordinary 
least square estimates of the wage equation, whereas UQR denotes the results of the unconditional 
quantile regressions. Test of equal effects is the result of a Wald test for the hypothesis that returns 
to years of education or pay penalty of informality is the same in all Colombian regions. The 
corresponding p-value in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5. Regional wage gap decomposition. 	
 
ATLANTIC   ORIENTAL 
 Mean 
  Quartiles 
 Mean 
  Quartiles 
    25th 50th 75th     25th 50th 75th 
  
                   Overall wage gap  0.087 ** 0.006 
 
0.068 ** 0.114 ** 0.190 ** 0.187 ** 0.118 ** 0.238 ** 
                    Composition Effect attributable to 
                   Education -0.020 ** -0.002 * -0.009 * -0.033 * 0.067 ** 0.014 ** 0.045 ** 0.113 ** 
Informal 0.012 ** 0.013 ** 0.007 ** -0.006 
  
0.017 ** 0.035 ** 0.004 
 
-0.018 
 Rest -0.023 ** -0.008 ** -0.013 ** -0.017 + 0.090 ** 0.057 ** 0.075 ** 0.114 ** 
Error   0.010 
  
 -0.002 
 
  -0.007 
 
  0.027 
  
-0.004 
  
0.058 ** -0.008 
 
0.013 
 Total explained by characteristics -0.021 ** 0.002 
 
-0.022 * -0.030 
 
0.171 ** 0.165 ** 0.115 ** 0.221 ** 
                    Wage structure effects attributable to 
                   Education 0.052 
  
0.048 ** 0.190 ** 0.378 ** 0.100 ** 
 
-0.037 ** 0.046 
 
0.450 ** 
Informality 0.000 
  
0.001 
 
0.009 
 
-0.022 
  
-0.012 
  
0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.026 
 Rest 0.137 
  
0.004 
 
0.034 
 
-0.200 
  
0.139 
  
0.174 ** 0.118 
 
-0.211 
 Constant -0.063 
  
-0.044 
 
-0.130 
 
0.025 
  
-0.203 + 
 
-0.118 
 
-0.151 
 
-0.188 
 Error -0.018 + 
 
 -0.005 
 
  -0.013 *  -0.037 * 
 
-0.004 
  
0.024 
 
0.007 
 
-0.009 
 Total wage structure 0.109 ** 0.004   0.091 ** 0.144 ** 0.019 
 
0.022   0.003   0.017 
 
 
                  
 
                  
 
CENTRAL   PACIFIC 
 Mean 
  Quartiles 
 Mean 
  Quartiles 
    25th 50th 75th     25th 50th 75th 
                                        
Overall wage gap 0.119 ** 0.111 ** 0.127 ** 0.189 ** 0.362 ** 0.499 ** 0.180 ** 0.334 ** 
                    Composition Effect attributable to 
                   Education 0.021 ** 0.005 ** 0.010 ** 0.035 ** 0.065 ** 0.023 ** 0.040 ** 0.105 ** 
Informal 0.005 ** 0.010 ** 0.003 * -0.004 
  
0.066 ** 0.165 ** 0.049 ** 0.022 
 Rest 0.007 
 
0.011 * 0.006 
 
0.007 
 
0.078 ** 0.098 ** 0.049 * 0.075 * 
Error   0.003 
  
  0.017 *    0.021 **   0.012 
  
-0.002 
  
0.018 
 
-0.091 ** 0.080 + 
Total explained by characteristics 0.036 ** 0.043 ** 0.040 ** 0.051 ** 0.207 ** 0.303 ** 0.047 + 0.283 ** 
                    Wage structure effects attributable to 
                   Education 0.029 
 
-0.061 ** 0.152 ** 0.339 ** 0.068 
 
-0.169 * 0.054 
 
0.443 ** 
Informality -0.005 
  
0.014 * 0.004 
 
-0.025 
  
0.028 + 
 
0.117 ** 0.034 * 0.016 
 Rest 0.025 
  
0.222 ** 0.005 
 
-0.069 
  
-0.093 
  
0.319 
 
-0.099 
 
-0.231 
 Constant 0.042 
 
-0.104 
 
-0.069 
 
-0.093 
 
0.179 
  
-0.063 
 
0.164 
 
-0.123 
 Error  -0.007 
  
 -0.002 
 
  -0.005 
 
 -0.014 
  
-0.028 + 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.021 + -0.054 + 
Total wage structure 0.083 **   0.069 ** 0.087 ** 0.138 **   0.155 **   0.196 ** 0.132   0.051   
 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
  
Table 6. Regional wage gap decomposition by gender. 	
ATLANTIC 
                      MEN 
 
  WOMEN 
  
    Quartiles  
   
    Quartiles   
   Mean     25th 50th 75th 
 
   Mean     25th 50th 75th 
  
          
  
         Overall wage gap 0.089 ** 0.027 ** 0.092 ** 0.108 ** Overall wage gap 0.083 ** -0.003 
 
0.032 + 0.137 ** 
                     Composition Effect attributable to 
          
Composition Effect attributable to 
         Education -0.030 ** -0.003 ** -0.010 ** -0.038 ** Education -0.033 * 
 
-0.004 * -0.014 * -0.059 * 
Informality 0.014 ** 0.014 ** 0.007 ** 0.000 
  
Informality 0.009 * 
 
0.012 ** 0.005 * -0.004 
 Rest -0.023 * 
 
-0.013 ** -0.010 ** -0.006 
  
Rest -0.013 
  
-0.007 
 
-0.015 ** -0.018 
 Error 0.006 
  
-0.004 
 
-0.029 ** -0.027 
  
Error 0.008 
  
-0.001 
 
-0.029 * 0.074 * 
Total explained by characteristics -0.033 ** -0.006 
 
-0.042 ** -0.070 ** Total explained by characteristics -0.029 ** -0.001 
 
-0.053 ** -0.006 ** 
                     Wage structure effects attributable to 
          
Wage structure effects attributable to 
         Education 0.042 
  
0.042 + 0.220 ** 0.513 ** Education 0.039 
  
0.039 
 
0.238 ** 0.299 * 
Informality 0.013 
  
0.007 
 
0.016 + 0.012 
  
Informality -0.007 
  
-0.004 
 
0.001 
 
-0.037 
 Rest 0.084 
  
0.037 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.278 
  
Rest 0.356 * 
 
0.040 
 
0.064 
 
0.283 
 Constant -0.008 
  
-0.051 
 
-0.059 
 
-0.052 
  
Constant -0.267 
  
-0.075 
 
-0.214 
 
-0.386 
 Error -0.008 
  
-0.003 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.017 
  
Error -0.009 
  
-0.003 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.016 
 Total wage structure 0.123 ** 0.033 ** 0.134 ** 0.178 ** 
 
Total wage structure 0.112 ** -0.002   0.084 ** 0.143 ** 
ORIENTAL                   
  
                  
  MEN 
 
  WOMEN 
  
     Quartiles  
   
    Quartiles   
   Mean     25th 50th 75th 
 
   Mean     25th 50th 75th 
                    
 
                    
Overall wage gap 0.179 ** 0.148 ** 0.119 ** 0.219 ** Overall wage gap 0.204 ** 0.260 ** 0.123 ** 0.240 ** 
                     Composition Effect attributable to 
          
Composition Effect attributable to 
         Education 0.068 ** 0.018 ** 0.044 ** 0.123 ** Education 0.053 ** 0.010 ** 0.035 ** 0.087 ** 
Informality 0.019 * 
 
0.028 ** 0.004 
 
-0.011 
  
Informality 0.015 * 
 
0.046 ** 0.007 
 
-0.024 + 
Rest 0.095 ** 0.057 ** 0.080 ** 0.139 ** Rest 0.091 ** 0.063 ** 0.065 ** 0.100 ** 
Error -0.004 
  
0.016 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.001 
  
Error -0.003 
  
0.122 ** 0.006 
 
0.013 
 Total explained by characteristics 0.178 ** 0.119 ** 0.113 ** 0.250 ** Total explained by characteristics 0.156 ** 0.241 ** 0.113 ** 0.176 ** 
                     Wage structure effects attributable to 
          
Wage structure effects attributable to 
         Education 0.139 ** -0.047 
 
0.057 
 
0.284 ** Education 0.013 
  
-0.032 
 
-0.018 
 
0.425 ** 
Informality -0.005 
  
-0.003 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
  
Informality -0.017 
  
0.022 * -0.007 
 
-0.058 * 
Rest 0.164 
  
0.212 * 0.208 
 
-0.280 
  
Rest 0.039 
  
0.057 
 
-0.051 
 
0.029 
 Constant -0.301 * 
 
-0.133 
 
-0.263 + -0.044 
  
Constant 0.023 
  
-0.024 
 
0.093 
 
-0.315 
 Error 0.004 
  
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.008 
  
Error -0.009 
  
-0.004 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.017 
 Total wage structure 0.001 
 
  0.029 ** 0.005   -0.031     Total wage structure 0.049 ** 0.019 ** 0.010 ** 0.064 ** 
 
CENTRAL 
                    
 
MEN 
  
WOMEN 
                    
 
                    
 Mean 
  Quartiles   
  Mean 
   Quartiles  
    25th 50th 75th 
 
    25th 50th 75th 
                    
 
                    
Overall wage gap 0.123 ** 0.114 ** 0.092 ** 0.176 ** Overall wage gap 0.114 ** 0.111 ** 0.093 ** 0.170 ** 
                     Composition Effect attributable to 
          
Composition Effect attributable to 
         Education 0.028 ** 0.005 * 0.011 ** 0.037 ** Education -0.007 
  
-0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.013 
 Informality 0.006 * 
 
0.010 ** 0.004 * -0.005 
  
Informality 0.002 
  
0.005 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 Rest 0.005 
  
0.018 ** 0.006 
 
0.005 
  
Rest 0.011 
  
0.004 
 
0.002 
 
0.018 
 Error 0.002 
  
0.017 
 
-0.029 ** 0.007 
  
Error 0.004 
  
0.007 
 
0.002 
 
0.010 
 Total explained by characteristics 0.041 ** 0.050 ** -0.007 ** 0.044 * 
 
Total explained by characteristics 0.010 
  
0.015 
 
0.002 
 
0.013 
 
                     Wage structure effects attributable to 
          
Wage structure effects attributable to 
         Education -0.024 
  
-0.031 
 
0.144 ** 0.368 ** Education 0.094 
  
-0.114 * 0.177 ** 0.287 * 
Informality -0.003 
  
0.007 
 
0.012 
 
-0.008 
  
Informality -0.010 
  
0.019 + -0.011 
 
-0.050 
 Rest 0.045 
  
0.205 ** 0.088 
 
-0.075 
  
Rest 0.045 
  
0.237 * -0.143 
 
0.163 
 Constant 0.062 
  
-0.119 
 
-0.146 
 
-0.154 
  
Constant -0.023 
  
-0.040 
 
0.069 
 
-0.236 
 Error 0.002 
  
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
  
Error -0.002 
  
0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.008 
 Total wage structure 0.082 ** 0.064 ** 0.099 ** 0.132 ** 
 
Total wage structure 0.104 ** 0.103 ** 0.092 ** 0.157 ** 
PACIFIC                   
  
                  
  MEN 
 
  WOMEN 
  
     Quartiles  
   
     Quartiles  
   Mean     25th 50th 75th 
 
   Mean     25th 50th 75th 
                    
 
                    
Overall wage gap 0.386 ** 0.507 ** 0.218 ** 0.346 ** Overall wage gap 0.329 ** 0.461 ** 0.138 ** 0.269 ** 
                     Composition Effect attributable to 
          
Composition Effect attributable to 
         Education 0.057 * 
 
0.008 
 
0.020 * 0.088 * 
 
Education 0.042 + 
 
0.010 
 
0.028 + 0.062 + 
Informality 0.091 ** 0.180 ** 0.076 ** 0.082 
  
Informality 0.048 * 
 
0.124 ** 0.053 * -0.002 
 Rest 0.054 + 
 
0.042 
 
0.061 * 0.023 
  
Rest 0.095 ** 0.081 ** 0.032 
 
0.080 + 
Error -0.008 
  
0.051 
 
0.026 
 
0.038 
  
Error 0.004 
  
0.098 + -0.102 ** 0.106 
 Total explained by characteristics 0.194 ** 0.281 ** 0.182 ** 0.231 ** Total explained by characteristics 0.189 ** 0.313 ** 0.011 * 0.246 
 
                     Wage structure effects attributable to 
          
Wage structure effects attributable to 
         Education -0.043 
  
-0.001 
 
0.191 ** 0.169 
  
Education 0.212 * 
 
-0.032 
 
0.107 
 
0.904 ** 
Informality 0.061 * 
 
0.139 ** 0.069 ** 0.091 + 
 
Informality 0.012 
  
0.085 ** 0.037 + -0.025 
 Rest -0.143 
  
0.541 * 0.522 ** -0.183 
  
Rest 0.208 
  
0.076 
 
-0.361 
 
0.311 
 Constant 0.316 
  
-0.456 
 
-0.745 ** 0.039 
  
Constant -0.265 
  
0.031 
 
0.362 
 
-1.124 * 
Error 0.002 
  
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
  
Error -0.028 
  
-0.013 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.043 
 Total wage structure 0.193 ** 0.226 ** 0.036 ** 0.116 ** 
 
Total wage structure 0.139 ** 0.147 ** 0.127 ** 0.023 ** 
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
Table A1. Estimation of all the coefficients in the wage equations. 	
  Colombia   Atlantic   Oriental 
 OLS UQR  OLS UQR  OLS UQR 
  
25th 50th 75th 
  
25th 50th 75th 
  
25th 50th 75th 
Years of education 0.07** 0.01** 0.04** 0.12** 
 
0.08** 0.01** 0.04** 0.13** 
 
0.06** 0.02** 0.03** 0.07** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Informal -0.14** -0.20** -0.09** -0.04 
 
-0.10** -0.11** -0.09** -0.05 
 
-0.10** -0.27** -0.08** 0.01 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
 
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.05] 
 
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] 
Experience (years) 0.01** 0.01** 0.00* 0.00* 
 
0.01* 0.00* 0 0 
 
0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Experience square (years) 0 -0.00** 0 0.00** 
 
0 0 0.00+ 0.00** 
 
-0.00+ -0.00** -0.00** -0.00+ 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Tenure (months) 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 
0.00** 0 0.00* 0 
 
0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Tenure square (months) -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
-0.00** -0.00+ -0.00** -0.00** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Women -0.08** -0.04** -0.03** -0.10** 
 
-0.06* 0 -0.02 -0.08+ 
 
-0.10** -0.12** -0.05* -0.08* 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
 
[0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] 
Married 0.03* 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
-0.01 0.02* -0.01 -0.11* 
 
0.08** 0.03 0.03 0.09* 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
 
[0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] 
Women * Married 0.03+ -0.01 0.01 0.09** 
 
0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.17* 
 
-0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] 
 
[0.04] [0.01] [0.03] [0.07] 
 
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.06] 
Head of household 0.11** 0.03** 0.07** 0.17** 
 
0.18** 0 0.09** 0.26** 
 
0.10** 0.05 0.05* 0.14** 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04] 
Women * Head of household -0.06** -0.02+ -0.05** -0.09** 
 
-0.09* 0 -0.06+ -0.17* 
 
-0.02 -0.01 0 -0.02 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] 
 
[0.04] [0.02] [0.03] [0.07] 
 
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.06] 
Temporary 0.01 0.10** -0.02+ -0.16** 
 
0.04 0.13** 0 -0.18** 
 
0.08** 0.20** 0.08** 0.03 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] 
 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.06] 
 
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] 
Permanent 0.09** 0.13** 0.04** -0.01 
 
0.13** 0.14** 0.09** 0.03 
 
0.11** 0.18** 0.07** 0.09+ 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] 
 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.06] 
 
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] 
Hours of work -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 
-0.02** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 
-0.01** -0.02** -0.01** -0.01** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Small size (11 - 50 workers) 0.07** 0.05** 0.04** 0.08** 
 
0.07** 0.06** 0.05* 0.06 
 
0.04+ 0.05 0.02 0.03 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] 
Medium size  (51- 100) 0.07** 0.06** 0.05** 0.13** 
 
0.10** 0.07** 0.07* 0.09 
 
0.11** 0.08 0.03 0.14* 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] 
 
[0.04] [0.01] [0.03] [0.07] 
 
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.07] 
Large size (101 or more) 0.12** 0.06** 0.06** 0.18** 
 
0.12** 0.05** 0.04+ 0.10* 
 
0.12** 0.04 0.02 0.14** 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] 
Industry -0.12** -0.01 -0.07** -0.18** 
 
-0.11** -0.01 -0.07+ -0.08 
 
-0.14** -0.04 -0.11** -0.21* 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.04] [0.01] [0.04] [0.09] 
 
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.09] 
Construction 0.08** 0.07** 0.05* 0.01 
 
0.10* 0 -0.01 0.08 
 
0.07 0.25** 0.06 -0.09 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.11] 
 
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.09] 
Sales, Hotels and Restaurants -0.17** -0.05** -0.10** -0.25** 
 
-0.18** -0.02+ -0.13** -0.25** 
 
-0.17** -0.07+ -0.17** -0.23** 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.04] [0.01] [0.04] [0.09] 
 
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.09] 
Transportation -0.16** -0.04* -0.05* -0.19** 
 
-0.08+ -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 
 
-0.12* 0 -0.06+ -0.13 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.10] 
 
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.10] 
Financial Intermediation -0.04+ 0 -0.02 -0.03 
 
-0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0 
 
-0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.05] [0.01] [0.04] [0.10] 
 
[0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.09] 
Social Services -0.08** -0.04** -0.04* -0.05 
 
-0.08+ -0.03+ -0.06 -0.04 
 
-0.11* -0.08+ -0.11** -0.12 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.04] [0.01] [0.04] [0.09] 
 
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.09] 
Constant 7.64** 8.13** 7.84** 7.33** 
 
7.57** 7.94** 7.80** 7.24** 
 
7.88** 8.26** 8.07** 7.84** 
 
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.07] 
 
[0.08] [0.04] [0.07] [0.16] 
 
[0.07] [0.09] [0.06] [0.13] 
Observations 13796 13796 13796 13796   2605 2605 2605 2605   2604 2604 2604 2604 	 	 	
Table A1. Estimation of all the coefficients in the wage equations. (cont) 	
  Central   Pacific   Golden Triangle 
 OLS UQR  OLS UQR  OLS UQR 
  
25th 50th 75th 
  
25th 50th 75th 
  
25th 50th 75th 
Years of education 0.08** 0.02** 0.03** 0.11** 
 
0.07** 0.04** 0.03** 0.09** 
 
0.08** 0.01** 0.05** 0.16** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Informal -0.10** -0.24** -0.06** 0.04 
 
-0.27** -0.31* -0.35** -0.29** 
 
-0.14** -0.15** -0.05+ -0.02 
 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.06] [0.12] [0.06] [0.09] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
Experience (years) 0.01** 0.01* 0.00+ 0.00 
 
0.01* 0.03** 0.01+ -0.01 
 
0.01** 0 0.00 0.00 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Experience square (years) 0.00 0.00 0 0 
 
0.00 -0.00* 0 0.00+ 
 
0.00 0.00 0 0.00* 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Tenure (months) 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Tenure square (months) -0.00* -0.00** -0.00+ -0.00* 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
-0.00* -0.00** -0.00** 0.00 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Women -0.07** -0.05* -0.01 -0.06 
 
-0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.03 
 
-0.10** -0.01 -0.06** -0.15** 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.04] 
 
[0.05] [0.09] [0.04] [0.08] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] 
Married 0.05* 0.02 0.03+ 0.08+ 
 
0.11* 0.15 0.05 0.08 
 
0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09+ 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.05] [0.10] [0.05] [0.08] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
Women * Married 0 0 -0.03 -0.02 
 
-0.07 -0.16 -0.13* -0.02 
 
0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.05 
 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.06] 
 
[0.07] [0.13] [0.06] [0.11] 
 
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.06] 
Head of household 0.11** 0.04 0.06** 0.14** 
 
0.09+ -0.12 -0.01 0.13 
 
0.06** 0.03** 0.06** 0.05 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.05] [0.10] [0.05] [0.08] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] 
Women * Head of household -0.09** -0.06+ -0.05* -0.08 
 
-0.11 0.11 -0.07 -0.2 
 
-0.02 -0.03* -0.06+ 0.03 
 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.07] 
 
[0.07] [0.15] [0.07] [0.12] 
 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.07] 
Temporary 0 0.06 -0.04+ -0.09 
 
0.25** 0.78** 0.28** -0.09 
 
-0.08** 0.06** -0.06* -0.30** 
 
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.06] [0.13] [0.07] [0.09] 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.05] 
Permanent 0.08** 0.10** -0.02 0.02 
 
0.31** 0.71** 0.38** 0.12 
 
0.05+ 0.08** 0.04+ -0.04 
 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.05] 
 
[0.06] [0.13] [0.07] [0.09] 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.05] 
Hours of work -0.01** -0.02** -0.01** -0.01** 
 
-0.02** -0.02** -0.01** -0.01** 
 
-0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Small size (11 - 50 workers) 0.09** 0.05+ 0.05** 0.12** 
 
0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.11 
 
0.06** 0.02* 0.04* 0.08+ 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04] 
 
[0.05] [0.10] [0.05] [0.07] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] 
Medium size  (51- 100) 0.08* 0.06+ 0.04+ 0.17* 
 
0.06 0.32* 0.08 -0.14 
 
0.04 0.01 0.03 0.1 
 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.07] 
 
[0.10] [0.15] [0.09] [0.16] 
 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.06] 
Large size (101 or more) 0.13** 0.07** 0.06** 0.19** 
 
0.10* 0.06 0 0.16+ 
 
0.11** 0.04** 0.08** 0.23** 
 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04] 
 
[0.05] [0.08] [0.05] [0.08] 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] 
Industry -0.16** -0.01 -0.09** -0.31** 
 
0 -0.27 0.06 0.13 
 
-0.12* 0 -0.04 -0.26* 
 
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] 
 
[0.12] [0.17] [0.09] [0.21] 
 
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.12] 
Construction 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 
 
0.09 -0.10 -0.02 0.29 
 
0.03 0.02 0.09+ 0.03 
 
[0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.10] 
 
[0.13] [0.20] [0.09] [0.22] 
 
[0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.13] 
Sales, Hotels and Restaurants -0.21** -0.09** -0.11** -0.34** 
 
-0.1 -0.27+ -0.06 -0.01 
 
-0.15** -0.02 -0.05 -0.32** 
 
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] 
 
[0.12] [0.15] [0.08] [0.21] 
 
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.12] 
Transportation -0.22** -0.03 -0.08** -0.38** 
 
-0.15 -0.22 -0.17+ 0.01 
 
-0.16** -0.03 0 -0.24+ 
 
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.09] 
 
[0.13] [0.17] [0.10] [0.22] 
 
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.13] 
Financial Intermediation -0.12** -0.03 -0.04 -0.23* 
 
0.01 -0.26 -0.09 0.23 
 
-0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.12 
 
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.10] 
 
[0.13] [0.18] [0.09] [0.22] 
 
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.12] 
Social Services -0.12** -0.06+ -0.07* -0.18* 
 
0.08 -0.31* -0.02 0.28 
 
-0.07 0 0 -0.07 
 
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.09] 
 
[0.12] [0.15] [0.08] [0.22] 
 
[0.05] [0.02] [0.05] [0.12] 
Constant 7.61** 8.16** 7.82** 7.38** 
 
7.43** 7.22** 8.01** 7.40** 
 
7.62** 8.01** 7.72** 7.12** 
 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.14] 
 
[0.17] [0.31] [0.14] [0.27] 
 
[0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.16] 
Observations 2992 2992 2992 2992   733 733 733 733   4862 4862 4862 4862 
Notes: Omitted categories are formal worker, single, men, no contract, microenterprise (1-10 workers) and agricultural, mining, electricity, gas or 
water sectors. Standard errors in brackets. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. OLS refers to the ordinary least square estimates of the wage equation, 
whereas UQR denotes the results of the unconditional quantile regressions.  
